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ABSTRACT
Botnets are now a major source for many network attacks, such as DDoS attacks and spam. However, most
traditional detection methods heavily rely on heuristically designed multi-stage detection criteria. In this paper,
we consider the neural network design challenges of using modern deep learning techniques to learn policies
for botnet detection automatically. To generate training data, we synthesize botnet connections with different
underlying communication patterns overlaid on large-scale real networks as datasets. To capture the important
hierarchical structure of centralized botnets and the fast-mixing structure for decentralized botnets, we tailor graph
neural networks (GNN) to detect the properties of these structures. Experimental results show that GNNs are
better able to capture botnet structure than previous non-learning methods when trained with appropriate data,
and that deeper GNNs are crucial for learning difficult botnet topologies. We believe our data and studies can be
useful for both the network security and graph learning communities.
1 INTRODUCTION
Botnets are networks of compromised computers that co-
ordinate to perform various malicious activities, such as
DDoS attacks, spamming, click-fraud scams, and personal
user information stealing. They remain an acute problem in
todays Internet. Botnets receive commands from a botmas-
ter through either centralized command-and-control (C&C)
structures, e.g. Muhstik (2019); Mirai (2019) or decentral-
ized peer-to-peer (P2P) C&C structures, e.g. Roboto (2019);
Mozi (2019). With centralized C&C channels in a hierar-
chical structure, the botmaster can communicate with bots
more effectively, but suffer from the single-point-of-failure
problem when the C&C channel is taken down due to detec-
tion and response efforts. To address this problem, botnets
began to communicate in P2P structures. Botnets in these
structures allow the botmaster to join and control at any part
of the botnet, which makes them harder to detect.
Existing work on botnet detection heavily depends on oper-
ators/researchers’ deep understanding of botnet behaviors
and requires a huge amount of manual labor. For example,
some works (Gu et al., 2008b;a; Bartos et al., 2016; Doshi
et al., 2018) rely on traffic patterns, such as packet sizes and
port numbers, to differentiate botnet traffic from background
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traffic. However, detailed traffic patterns can be confidential
and encrypted or intentionally manipulated to evade mon-
itoring (Gu et al., 2008a). Furthermore, some approaches
require additional prior knowledge of botnet such as domain
names (Perdisci & Lee, 2018) or DNS blacklists (Andriesse
et al., 2015). Some researchers (Mirai, 2019; Herwig et al.,
2019) use honeypot techniques to study these patterns, but
honeypots trap the traffic directed to them only and cannot
detect the real botnet in the wild network.
There have also been many works that leverage specific
topology features of botnets such as mixing rates (Nagaraja
et al., 2010), number and size of connected graph compo-
nents (Collins & Reiter, 2007; Iliofotou et al., 2008; 2009),
etc. For example, P2P botnets often have fast mixing rates
because botnets form a topology that is most efficient in
diffusing information and launching attacks. Nagaraja et al.
(2010) proposes a detection approach based on this feature
of fast mixing rate. However, a major obstacle is that the
massive scale of network communications makes it hard
to differentiate botnet communication patterns from back-
ground Internet traffic. Previous works (Nagaraja et al.,
2010; Jaikumar & Kak, 2015) take significant human efforts
to define topology features, perform multiple pre-filtering
steps, and require data-dependent feature engineering and
parameter tuning. Thus, one challenge of designing ma-
chine learning models for botnet detection is that they need
to capture the topology of communication in large-scale
graphs using an automatic detection mechanism.
In this work, we propose to tailor graph neural networks
(GNN) to identify botnets within massive background Inter-
net communication graphs by automatically identifying their
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topological features (i.e., communication patterns). GNNs
are well-suited for the botnet detection problem given the
large graphs of complex topological structures. In each layer
of a GNN, nodes update their states and exchange informa-
tion by passing messages to their neighboring nodes. Thus,
the model can automatically identify node dependencies in
the graph after many layers of message passing. There is
no need for explicit filters, explicit feature definitions, or
manual tuning. Although GNNs have gained increasing
popularity in social networks (Kipf & Welling, 2016), code
analysis (Allamanis et al., 2017), scientific modeling (Zit-
nik et al., 2018), etc., there have not been many datasets
and studies applying GNNs to the area of network secu-
rity. We specifically design GNNs for the problem of botnet
detection that can automatically capture the hierarchical
structure of centralized botnets and the fast-mixing structure
for decentralized botnets.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We consider the challenge of a fully automatic botnet
detection approach. Our experiments consider large
Internet traffic data in many different botnet scenarios.
• Our GNN approach is tailored to botnet detection. It
is solely based on topology and takes in non-attributed
graphs. This approach improves detection rates under
controlled false positive rates compared to previous
work.
• Our datasets for GNN detection are communication net-
work graphs of a large scale compared to many graph
benchmark datasets. To be specific, one single graph in
our datasets contains over 140k nodes and 700k edges,
for which we find deeper models are needed to detect
some of the topological properties.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 and Sec-
tion 3, we present our botnet detection datasets and model.
We evaluate our approach in Section 4. Section 5 provides
related works of previous detection approaches. We con-
clude in Section 6.
2 DATA
Given a communication graph, the detection goal is to re-
liably isolate the botnet nodes. We formulate this problem
as a binary node classification problem on graphs and intro-
duce datasets for botnet detection to facilitate model training
and testing later.
Since it has so far been difficult to determine the size of
botnets (Saad et al., 2011), ground truth of botnet on real
datasets with P2P botnet inside background traffic can be
inaccurate. We embed both synthetic and real topology of
botnet traffic graphs within real background traffic graphs
Figure 1. An example of CAIDA networks embedded with a syn-
thetic P2P botnet. Most of the red botnet nodes are able to reach
the rest of the botnet within several hops. The botnet has a faster
mixing rate than the background network.
for datasets. We generate datasets for training, validation
and testing of our approach with pure graph topology in
the same way. We are able to examine our approach under
different scenarios, since we can control the settings of
overlay botnets, such as topology types and botnet sizes.
Background Traffic We consider all traces collected in
2018 from the IP backbone from CAIDA (2018)’s monitors
for background traffic. Similar to Nagaraja et al. (2010), we
perform the aggregation for the traffic graph and conduct
experiments over the resulting subnet-level graph since net-
flow traces are aggregated into subnets for anonymity. We
select a random subset of nodes in the background traffic as
botnet nodes for embedding the botnet topology.
Botnet Traffic To investigate sensitivity of our techniques,
we embed the background traffic with particular over-
laid P2P topologies we synthesize, including DE BRUIJN
(Kaashoek & Karger, 2003), KADEMLIA (Maymounkov &
Mazieres, 2002), CHORD (Stoica et al., 2001), and LEET-
CHORD (Jelasity & Bilicki, 2009). We also overlay two
real botnets from Garcia et al. (2014) in the manner as the
synthetic ones: a decentralized botnet P2P and a centralized
botnet C2 captured in 2011. As the two botnets are from
real malware, their traffic contains attack behaviors apart
from inner communication traffic.
Both centralized and decentralized botnets exhibit topolog-
ical properties different from background networks. Cen-
tralized botnets are strongly hierarchical with a star shape.
Meanwhile, decentralized P2P botnet topology is designed
to diffuse information fast inside botnets so that they receive
a command for launching an attack efficiently. Mathemati-
cally, the rate for random walk to reach the stationary dis-
tribution inside botnet, i.e. the mixing rate, is higher than
that of background traffic. An example of P2P botnet in
Figure 1 shows intuitively the high mixing rate of the botnet,
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where nodes in the red botnet can easily reach the rest of the
botnet within several hops. Since decentralized botnets are
not as explicit as the centralized botnet with a hierarchical
structure, we focus more on detecting the decentralized P2P
botnets as all of the synthetic topologies are decentralized.
3 MODEL
Define a communication graph as G = {V, A}, where V
is the node set consisting of n unique nodes {v1, . . . , vn}
observed in traffic traces, and A ∈ Rn×n is a symmetric
(typically sparse) adjacency matrix with aij = 1 represent-
ing an edge (direct communication) between nodes vi and
vj , and 0 otherwise. We use D = diag(d1, . . . , dn) with
di =
∑n
j=1 aij to denote the diagonal node degree matrix.
1
Note that A and D represent graph structures and are fixed
throughout the learning process.
We utilize a GNN model (Kipf & Welling, 2016) to learn
the botnet topology for end-to-end detection. A GNN is a
type of neural network that constructs a node vector repre-
sentation as a vector of size h through a stack of multiple
graph convolutional layers. This representation captures
the important context of the node. At the final layer, these
representations are used to predict properties related to the
node, in our case whether it is in the botnet. Formally, let
X(l) ∈ Rn×h denote the node feature matrix after layer l
and the feature vector (row) for node i represented as x(l)i .
The vectors are updated every layer, so as to construct a
hierarchical profile with higher-level vectors representing
broader and more abstract properties.
At each GNN layer, the representation of each node is first
transformed via a learned matrix W (l)
x˜
(l)
i ← x(l−1)i W (l) (1)
Then each node’s representation is averaged with the rep-
resentations of its direct neighbors, which allows the node
representation to include its neighbor information as a way
to effectively explore the graph structure:
x
(l)
i ←
n∑
j=1
aij√
didj
x˜
(l)
j , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (2)
where the normalization is commonly used to prevent nu-
merical instabilities for deep models, and is shown to have
performance gains (Kipf & Welling, 2016). Furthermore, a
non-linear function is applied at the end to finish updating
the hidden node representations for the current layer. More
compactly, we can express the above update in matrix form
as
X(l) ← σ
(
A¯X(l−1)W (l)
)
(3)
1We consider undirected and non-weighted graphs for simplic-
ity, generalization to directed and weighted graphs is straightfor-
ward. We also assume self-loops in A whenever they are needed.
with the normalized adjacency matrix A¯ = D−1/2AD−1/2,
and the non-linear activation function σ which is typically
ReLU (i.e. σ(x) = max(0, x)). We also have a separate
linear transformation to map forward the last layer’s repre-
sentation,
X(l) ← σ
(
X(l−1)U (l) + σ
(
A¯X(l−1)W (l)
))
(4)
where U (l) is a learnable transformation matrix at layer l.
The top node representations after L layers are then inputted
to a linear layer followed by the softmax function for the
final classification. The updating procedures are frequently
summarized as a message-passing framework (Gilmer et al.,
2017), as node features are passed to its neighboring nodes
in every layer. With the stack of L layers, the final represen-
tation of each node would be able to learn useful local prop-
erties within its L-hop neighborhood for the downstream
task. For botnets, we will see that we need multiple layers
to capture the necessary neighbor information.
The form of A¯ impacts how the neighboring node features
are normalized before aggregation, and different choices
lead to different GNN model variants. Examples include
symmetric normalization A¯ = D−1/2AD−1/2 based on
both the source and target nodes’ degrees (Kipf & Welling,
2016), graph attention networks that calculate A¯ with
a learnable non-linear function based on node features
(Velicˇkovic´ et al., 2017), and independent normalization
for each edge (Bresson & Laurent, 2018).
We customize the GNN framework for our topological bot-
net detection with the following two changes. First, to better
utilize the fast-mixing property of botnet topologies (Na-
garaja et al., 2010), we propose to use a random walk style
normalization A¯ = D−1A which only involves the degree
of the source nodes to equate the normalized adjacency
matrix to the corresponding probability transition matrix.
Second, since we want feature initialization agnostic to any
ordering of nodes for purely topological learning, we set the
first layer input to all ones with X(0) = 1 ∈ Rn×1. This
differs from the common practice of dealing with featureless
graphs by assigning identities to each node, i.e. X(0) = In
(Kipf & Welling, 2016). Note that in this setup some more
sophisticated GNN models that normalize by target degree
such as the graph attention model (Velicˇkovic´ et al., 2017)
will lose their learning capacity solely based on topologies,
since normalizing among neighboring node features will not
differentiate any local patterns.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Methods
Datasets and Evaluation We generate a collection of
datasets as discussed in Section 2, including 4 synthetic
botnet topologies, DE BRUIJN, KADEMLIA, CHORD, and
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DATA
SPLIT
#GRAPHS AVG#NODES
AVG
#EDGES
#BOTNET
NODES
TRAIN 768 143895 829231 10000
VAL 96 143763 828934 10000
TEST 96 144051 830089 10000
Table 1. Botnet dataset statistics for CHORD topology with 10k
botnet nodes. Each graph in the dataset has a different number of
nodes and edges but the same number of botnet nodes. Datasets
of other topologies have same numbers of graphs in each data
split and a similar number of nodes and edges, but with different
numbers of botnet nodes.
LEET-CHORD, as well as 2 real botnet topologies we cap-
tured, C2 and P2P. The background network graph contains
about 140k nodes and 700k edges (undirected) on average.
For each of the synthetic botnet topologies, we generate
graphs containing 100/1k/10k botnet nodes, and the real bot-
nets contain about 3k botnet nodes. Each dataset contains
960 graphs which are randomly split into training, valida-
tion, and test sets with ratio 8:1:1.2 The dataset statistics
for CHORD with 10k botnet nodes are shown in Table 1.
Other datasets are similar except for the number of botnet
nodes. All the graphs are undirected and preprocessed to
have self-loops to speed up training. Since the number of
botnet nodes is extremely small for the 100/1k-bots datasets
compared with the overall network size, we train models
on 10k-bots dataset and tested on datasets with different
sizes of botnets which helps detection on smaller botnet
communities compared to directly training on them.
For evaluation of the trained model, since the datasets are
highly imbalanced (0.05% - 10% of the nodes are botnet
nodes depending on the particular graph), we report average
false positive rate, false negative rate, detection rate to get
fair evaluations and to be consistent with previous works.
We compare the GNN model with a non-learning special-
ized detection method, BotGrep (Nagaraja et al., 2010), and
a simple machine learning baseline, logistic regression (LR)
which takes in the following constructed features for each
node: its own degree, and the mean, max, min of its neigh-
bors’ degrees. Note that BotGrep is a specialized multi-stage
algorithm for topological botnet detection, which utilizes
the fast-mixing property of random walks within the botnet
community and relies on several hand-tuned heuristics. This
is in contrast with our GNN detection method which is fully
automatic but data-driven.
Model and Training Configuration Our base GNN
model structure contains 12 layers, as we found deeper mod-
els are helpful for better detection on many botnet topolo-
gies. We use ReLU for non-linear activation between layers,
2The datasets are available at https://github.com/
harvardnlp/botnet-detection.
and a bias vector is added after each layer. The input to the
model is just the graph, as the learning is purely based on
topology without any help of node features. The embedding
size is 32 for all layers, and there is an additional linear layer
for the final output on each node.
Models are trained on all the graphs in the training split
of the data, for which we use Adam optimizer (Kingma
& Ba, 2014) with cross entropy loss, learning rate 0.005,
and weight decay 5e-4. Learning rate scheduling is applied,
where we reduce the learning rate to its 1/4 whenever the
average loss on the validation set is not reduced with a pa-
tience number one. We also use early stopping whenever the
average validation loss is not reduced in 5 epochs consecu-
tively. Our implementations are based on PyTorch (Paszke
et al., 2019) and PyTorch Geometric (Fey & Lenssen, 2019).
4.2 Results
We present our main results in Table 2 and Table 3. The
logistic regression (LR) model performs poorly in most of
the cases, indicating that it is not enough to only utilize local
information up to 2-hop neighbors and there are no hidden
representations to allow more complex learning. Note, the
reported results of BotGrep are from previous work based
on a single graph instance, while our results are averaged
over all the graphs in the test set. Still, the end-to-end GNN
method achieves comparable or better results with BotGrep
showing higher detection rates and lower false positive rates
in most of the cases, which validates its application on
automated botnet detection based on network topologies.
Moreover, although the GNN models are trained on graphs
with 10k botnet nodes, the detection performance on 1k and
100 botnet nodes does not deteriorate too much regardless
of the worsening class imbalance problem (no tuning is
applied for the detection threshold), which also supports the
robustness of the automated approach.
4.3 Analysis
For the analysis of different model variations we adopt the
average F1 score as our basic metric for better illustration,
as it takes into consideration both the false positive rate and
the detection rate thus is easier to compare.
Detection on Small Botnets To see how much training
of larger botnet communities help for detection on much
smaller communities, in Figure 2 we plot detection results of
our 12-layer GNN model on 1k-bots dataset, when trained
on 10k-bots and 1k-bots datasets respectively. We can see
that the model trained on larger botnet community clearly
outperforms. We attribute this to the data-driven nature of
our detection method, which would suffer from poor quality
or inadequate amount of correct labels for efficient learning.
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DE BRUIJN
100 1k 10k
FP FN DET FP FN DET FP FN DET
LR 0.84 8.01 91.99 0.85 7.39 92.61 0.85 7.00 93.00
BotGrep* 0.00 2.00 98.00 0.01 2.40 97.60 0.12 2.35 97.65
GNN 0.00 0.45 99.55 0.00 0.47 99.53 0.00 0.10 99.90
KADEMLIA
100 1k 10k
FP FN DET FP FN DET FP FN DET
LR 1.41 81.14 18.87 1.41 80.47 19.53 1.41 80.37 19.63
BotGrep* 0.00 3.20 97.80 0.01 2.48 98.52 0.10 2.12 97.88
GNN 0.02 2.13 97.87 0.02 1.54 98.46 0.03 1.27 98.73
CHORD
100 1k 10k
FP FN DET FP FN DET FP FN DET
LR 1.80 83.23 16.77 1.83 83.34 16.66 1.83 83.77 16.23
BotGrep* 0.00 3.00 97.00 0.01 2.32 97.68 0.08 1.94 98.06
GNN 0.02 1.14 98.86 0.02 1.29 98.72 0.02 1.34 98.66
LEET-CHORD
100 1k 10k
FP FN DET FP FN DET FP FN DET
LR 2.31 74.76 25.24 2.31 75.46 24.54 2.31 75.57 24.43
BotGrep* 0.00 3.00 97.00 0.03 1.60 98.40 0.42 1.00 99.00
GNN 0.01 1.05 98.95 0.01 0.93 99.07 0.01 0.89 99.11
Table 2. Botnet detection results on synthetic botnet topologies. FP represents the false positive rate, FN represents the false negative rate,
DET represents the botnet detection rate. All of the measures of our model are averaged over the test set, and are rounded to two decimals.
The results from BotGrep* are cited from Nagaraja et al. (2010) based on a single graph instance, so caution should be used when making
a direct comparison.
FP FN DET
C2
LR 0.67 96.82 3.18
GNN-2 0.00 1.00 0.00
GNN 0.01 0.97 99.03
P2P
LR 7.89 99.02 0.98
GNN-2 0.00 99.92 0.08
GNN 0.01 0.49 99.51
Table 3. Botnet detection results on real botnet topologies. GNN-2
is our GNN model with only 2 layers.
Model Properties We consider varying the number of
GNN layers for all the synthetic botnet topologies. The re-
sults are plotted in Figure 3. The general trend is that deeper
models help on all datasets. In particular, the model needs
at least 6 layers to discover useful topological properties for
reliable detection on most of the topologies, and more layers
still benefit though the gains are diminishing. However, it is
also clear that different topologies behave differently under
the same GNN model structure. For example, DE BRUIJN
botnets are the easiest to detect and shallow models of 2-
3 layers can already do well, while CHORD botnets need
much deeper models to do better detection. The overall diffi-
culty of detection, as in terms of the performance gain when
the GNN model goes deeper, is CHORD > KADEMLIA >
LEET-CHORD > DE BRUIJN.
We explore in more detail some network properties with
different botnet topologies to understand different GNN
behaviors on them. The mixing time of random walks on a
graph is roughly the number of steps to reach the stationary
distribution, which is typically smaller for botnets compared
to normal traffic, and the bigger the gap is the easier to
detect. We thus calculate the 2nd largest eigenvalue λ2 of
the random walk probability transition matrix on a graph that
is positively related to the mixing time. A smaller eigenvalue
results in shorter mixing time and presumably fewer layers
in GNN. The average path length lG represents on average
how close any two nodes in a graph in hop distance, so a
smaller value would indicate that messages of most nodes
can be diffused throughout the graph faster, which should
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Figure 2. Average F1 scores on 1k-bots test sets.
also correspond to fewer layers needed in GNN. We present
these values in Table 4. As we can see, the topological
properties justify the results in Figure 3, where botnets with
smaller 2nd largest eigenvalues reach a higher score early
(in the order of DE BRUIJN > LEET-CHORD > KADEMLIA
> CHORD) and the number of layers needed is around the
average path length.
For the real botnets, we found that there is a sharp phase
transition after 3 layers with the model starting to perform
very well from almost nothing, and more layers bring little
gain. As can be seen in Table 3, the poor LR baseline and
GNN-2 results are consistent, indicating 2-hop neighbor
information is not adequate. As for the unnecessary need
of deeper models as for other synthetic botnets, it can be
explained by the fact that these botnets contain star-shaped
attack traffics towards a victim, such as DDoS attack and
spam. Since most nodes in the botnet are able to reach
their victim within few hops traveling through a hub node
(because of the star-shaped topology), it makes sense that a
relatively shallow model can detect this pattern.
5 RELATED WORK
Previous works (Gu et al., 2008b;a; Andriesse et al., 2015;
Bartos et al., 2016; Doshi et al., 2018; Perdisci & Lee, 2018)
on botnet detection are mostly based on traffic analysis.
BotMiner (Gu et al., 2008a) clusters nodes with similar
communication traffic and similar malicious traffic and then
performs cross-cluster correlation to differentiate botnet
nodes with other nodes. Another work (Bartos et al., 2016)
uses statistical feature representation computed from the
network traffic and train a classifier to recognize malicious
behavior. However, botnets can intentionally manipulate
their communication patterns or encrypted channel to evade
traffic monitoring according to Gu et al. (2008a). Further-
more, some approaches require additional knowledge of
botnet such as domain names (Perdisci & Lee, 2018), DNS
blacklists (Andriesse et al., 2015). Some researchers (Mirai,
2019; Herwig et al., 2019) use Honeypot techniques to study
2 4 6 8 10 12
number of layers
92
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Figure 3. Average F1 scores on 10k-bots test sets with varying
number of layers, among different botnet topologies.
DE BRUIJN KADEMLIA CHORD LEET-CHORD
λ2 0.7493 0.9458 0.9997 0.9350
lG 3.76 6.94 20.61 8.73
Table 4. Network properties (2nd largest eigenvalue λ2 and aver-
age path length lG) for 4 types of botnets of size 10k.
these patterns, which only trap the botnet directed to them.
There are also topology-based approaches (Collins & Reiter,
2007; Iliofotou et al., 2008; 2009; Nagaraja et al., 2010;
Jaikumar & Kak, 2015; Zhou et al., 2018). Nagaraja et al.
(2010) utilize the unique overlay topology patterns and lo-
calize botnet through prefiltering, clustering and validation.
However, these approaches involves multiple manual steps
of filtering and clustering, and elaborate threshold tuning to
identify the embedded botnet subgraph. Collins & Reiter
(2007) observe the number of connected graph components
since communication insides botnets will suddenly increase
that number. Iliofotou et al. (2009) use a graph-level metric
for the size of the largest connected component as well as
spatial and temporal metrics on node and edge level.
6 CONCLUSION
We propose to detect P2P botnets in an end-to-end data-
driven approach with graph neural networks. To extensively
study the automated detection method, we overlay synthetic
or real botnet topologies with different underlying communi-
cation patterns on large-scale real background traffic graphs
to generate datasets, and apply GNN models to capture the
special topology of P2P botnets. Experiments show the ef-
fectiveness of our approach compared with the non-learning
method, and both our data and studies exhibit their use-
fulness for both the network security and graph learning
communities. Future works include extending the approach
to other network security problems where graph patterns are
important, such as DDoS attacks and prefix hijackings.
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